Unlike the neoclassical theory of investment, the literature based on asymmetric information emphasizes the roleplayed by moral hazard and adverse selection problems in a firm'sdecision to invest in physical and human capital. The presence of asymmetric information means that the classical dichotomy between real and financial variables may no longer hold. Financial variables can have an impact on real variables, such as the level of investment and the real interest rate, as well as propagate and amplify the effects of exogenous shocks to the economy. For example, Bernanke andGertler (1989) show that a firm'snetworth (afinancial variable) can be used as collateral in order to reduce the agency cost associated with the presence of asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers. In this model, firms'investment decisions are not only dependent on the present value of future marginal productivity of capital, as the q -theory predicts, but also on the level of collateral available to the firms when they entera loan contract. Since economists started to look at real phenomena abstracting from the Arrow-Debreu framework with its frictionless capital markets, a vast literature has been developed on the rela- tionshipbetween investment decisions and firms'financing constraints (see Hubbard, 1998, for a review). Even though asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders maybe not the only source of imperfection in the credit markets, firms seem to prefer internal to external finance to fund their investments. This observation leads to the prediction of a positive relationship between investment and internal finance. The first study on panel data by Fazzari, Hubbard, andPeterson (1988) finds that, after controlling for investment opportunities with To bin's q , changes in net worth have a greater impact on investment by firms with higher costs of external financing. The link between the cost of external financing and investment decisions not only sheds light on the dynamics of business cycles but also represents an important element in understanding economic development and growth. For instance, in the presence of moral hazard in the credit market, firms that need a bank loan may be induced to undertake risky investment projects with low expected marginal productivity. This corporate decision affects the growth path of the economy, which may evenfall into a poverty trap (see Zicchino, 2001 ). Rajanand Zingales (1998) , Demirguc-Kuntand Maksimovic (1998) and Wurgler (2000) , among others, have investigated the link between finance and growth by asking whether underdeveloped legal and financial systems could prevent firms from investing in potentially profitable growth opportunities. Their empirical results show that an active stock market, developed financial intermediaries and the respect of legal norms are determinants of economic growth. Estimation of the relationship between investment and financial variables is challenging because it is difficult for an econometrician to observe firms'net worth and investment opportunities. In theory, the measure of investment opportunities is the present value of expected future profits from additional capital investment, or what is commonly called marginal q . This is the shadow value of an additional unit of capital and, under certain conditions, it can be shown to be a sufficient statistic for investment ( Hayashi, 1982 ). In other words, it is the 'fundamental'factor that determines investment policy of profit-maximizing firms inefficient markets. The difficulty in measuring marginal q , which is not observable, results in low explanatory power of the q -models and, typically, entails implausible estimates of the adjustment cost parameters,download.
Tidak ada komentar:
Posting Komentar